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1.0

Introduction1

1.1

The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) notes the promulgation of an
Immigration Bill in Government Gazette Vol. 416 (No. 20889) on 15 February 2000 and
the invitation to submit comments. SAMP supports the Department’s contention,
implicit in the gazetting of a new Bill, that the Aliens Control Act is an unacceptable
instrument for the sound and effective management of migration. The rescinding of the
Aliens Control Act and its replacement by a new Immigration Act is therefore a matter of
highest priority. However, it is equally important that such legislation is not rushed; that
it is constitutionally-sound, implementable and cost-effective.

1.2

SAMP’s input to the public process of revising the Bill is contained in this document.
However, we note the existence of a separate process of review of the White Paper on
International Migration by the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs which is holding
public hearings on the White Paper from 15-20 May 2000. The Committee is apparently
not considering the Immigration Bill at this time. SAMP is unclear how these two
processes inter-relate and will therefore also be making an input to the Portfolio
Committee reviewing the White Paper.

1.3

The Immigration Bill notes the limited list of organizations consulted by the drafter(s).
There are some notable absences from this list, including the Department of Labour,
COSATU and prominent NGO’s in the migration field. It is unclear why the drafters
would consult Anglo American Corporation and the South African Chamber of Mines
and not NUM. In addition, it is unclear why Georgetown University and the US INS
were the only organizations consulted externally. The Immigration Bill does not specify
what was done with the numerous public and expert submissions received by the
Department on the White Paper. It is possible that these inputs informed the drafting of
the Bill although that is not clear. It has been reported that the Immigration Bill has not
changed substantially from an earlier Migration Bill which was prepared before 30
November (the deadline for submissions on the White paper).

1.4

The intent of any Bill is to give effect to the policies laid out, and accepted by
government, in a policy White Paper. Hence, there should be consistency between the
principles of the White Paper and the immigration legislation which accompanies or
emanates from the White Paper. In our view, the Immigration Bill is problematic in this
regard. There are elements in the White Paper which are ignored in the Immigration Bill.
Contrariwise, there are certain provisions in the Immigration Bill which appear to have
no rationale or justification in the White Paper. This input aims to point out these
inconsistencies.

1.5

In its submission to the Department of Home Affairs on 30 November 1999, SAMP
identified a series of problems with the White Paper on International Migration.
1
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However, many of the problematic areas in the White Paper have been carried over into
the Bill. SAMP’s submission on the White Paper is therefore appended to this document
for ease of reference. This input also aims to show how the Immigration Bill replicates
some of the problems previously identified in the White paper.
1.6

As many commentators have noted, the White Paper was unclear on numerous policy
issues; sometimes making definitive recommendations and sometimes merely
speculating on whether some measure might be desirable. The lack of definitiveness on
key issues means that it is unclear whether many proposals are government policy or not.
Some of each type of recommendation are incorporated into the Bill so the problem is not
resolved by reference to the Bill.

1.7

The emphasis in this input is on problem areas with the Immigration Bill. However, the
Bill does contain many positive elements that are far superior to the Aliens Control Act.
For example, the provisions of Section 3(6), Section 11, Section 16, Section 19, Section
21(1), Section 28(1), Section 29 (1) (a,e,f), Section 33 (1) (a to c), Section 34 (1) and (2),
Section 40. In our view, these and like sections and sub-sections, should be enshrined in
the finalized Immigration Act.

1.8

This input begins with some general comments on the Immigration Bill’s purposes.
Then it considers points of contradiction with the White Paper. Finally, on the Bill itself,
our approach is to identify particular sections where the proposed process:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

will not assist the government in reaching its stated goals
is in conflict with its stated goals
is counter to common law notions of procedural fairness
potentially violates the Constitution and Bill of Rights
has been tried and failed in other jurisdictions
will have an effect opposite to the one intended
is unimplementable for reasons of logistics, cost, etc.

There are also statutory issues that need to be considered if this Bill is to be become law
(e.g. interaction with the Public Service Act, the Public Finance management Act and the
Administrative Justice Act).
2.0

A Note On Language and Terminology

2.1

SAMP notes the intent of the Department of Home Affairs to “promote a human-rights
based culture in both government and civil society in respect of immigration control”
(Section 29(1)(a) and to “prevent and deter xenophobia” within its own ranks (Section
29(1)(e)). The language used within legislation is both a marker and measure of the
seriousness of this intention. SAMP commends the drafters of the Bill for abandoning
2
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some of the provocative, misleading and inflamatory language and terminology of the
Aliens Control Act and the White Paper. The repeated use of the term “foreigner” is, we
suggest, still suggestive of a siege mentality which views all non-citizens and nonresidents as a potential threat. We recommend the substitution of “foreign subject” or
“foreign national” for “foreigner” in the text of the Bill. Illegality should be tied to
residence not identity. We therefore recommend the substitution of “illegal resident” for
“illegal foreigner.”
2.2

SAMP notes the structure of the Bill which deals, first, with conditions of entry and
residence; and only then with conditions of enforcement. This structure conveys the
appropriate message that the government is not opposed to entry that is managed, legal
and in the best interests of the country.

3.0

General Comments on the Immigration Bill

3.1

Even without reading the White Paper and its policy underpinnings, it is clear from a
reading of the Bill that the Government is seeking to largely model its immigration law
after that of the United States. This has some positive and negative aspects. But it is not
based on any systematic analysis (here or in the White paper) of American immigration
law or its appropriateness to South Africa.

3.2

The rationale for the new Bill include the usual objectives of any immigration legislation:
using immigration to enrich the country economically and culturally, while protecting the
jobs and futures of the current citizenry. The objective that seems to override all, is the
need to deter and prevent people from illegally migrating to South Africa. SAMP has
argued that the extent of unauthorized residence in South Africa has been grossly
exaggerated by the HSRC. SAMP notes with alarm recent statements by politicians that
there are now 8 million illegal residents of South Africa. This assertion has no basis in
fact.

3.3

The objective of controlling illegal residence is consistent with that of most other nationstates and is a legitimate concern. But how one goes about it is another matter. In
addition, the conditions that define the parameters of illegality (entry and residence
requirements) clearly need to be rethought and changed in South Africa. This the Bill
certainly does, though the changes are not all positive.

3.4

The stated goal is that the legislation will deter people from coming or staying in South
Africa illegally and “encourage” them to voluntarily repatriate by creating conditions that
make South Africa an unattractive place to live. The Department has apparently not done
any research to test this premise. This approach has not worked elsewhere because for
the vast majority of illegal residents, simply living in the destination country is better
than returning home to nothing or with nothing.
3
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3.5

The policy wisdom of the proposed community policing approach is highly debatable.
First, the strategy will lead to incitement of violence against those thought to be foreign
and will likely increase not reduce xenophobia and intolerance. Second, through
insistence on presentation of formal identification documents of basic services it will lead
to further inefficiencies in already overburdened service delivery.

3.6

The SAMP response made various inputs on the gender-bias of the White Paper. We can
identify no point at which these concerns have been taken into account in the Draft Bill.

3.7

The Immigration Bill is extremely business-friendly. This is not necessarily a problem if
the interests of business and of all South Africans are coincident. For example, if this
Immigration Bill loosens the constraints on foreign investment and economic growth
imposed by the Aliens Control Act, this could be argued to be in everyone’s interest. On
the other hand, the proposed corporate permit section of the Bill has the effect of placing
employees under the near total control of their employers. The issue of corporate permits
willy-nilly could also disadvantage many South Africans. Labour’s views on these
provisions of the Bill should be sought and carefully considered.

4.0

Comparing the White Paper and the Bill

4.1

The White Paper proposed a hierarchical approach to immigration policy in which the
SADC countries would have “preferred status.” The mechanisms were not spelt out in
the White Paper and this recommendation is completely ignored in the Immigration Bill.

4.2

The White Paper makes several references to the “need” of the mines and farms to
employ non-South African labour and that policy should accommodate this need, while
simultaneously seeking to encourage them to reduce their foreign-labour dependence
(Section 4.4.6). The White Paper simply accepted the word of these employers and did
no independent investigation of these so-called “needs.” It also did not canvas other
employers to see if they had similar needs. The White Paper therefore singled out these
sectors (in direct contradiction to the recommendations of the Green Paper) as requiring
special treatment. The White paper made no reference to the desirability of bilateral
treaties which currently exist and give these employers almost complete discretion.
Various bodies, including the National Labour Market Commission, COSATU and the
NUM, have proposed scrapping these treaties and the deferred pay system.
Section 18(5) of the Bill is therefore an astonishing concession to the mining industry
since it has no backing within the White Paper. The clause potentially exempts unnamed
employers (but by implication the mines and farms) from all the provisions of the
corporate permits scheme proposed for all other employers, entrenches the bilateral
mechanism and permits compulsory deferred pay. It also potentially allows them to
4
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employ a “wholly” foreign workforce. None of this is mentioned, proposed or sanctioned
in the White Paper. The fact that authority is deferred to the Department of Labour on
this issue does not detract from the central purpose and effect of this clause: to maintain
the status quo and the migrant labour system and the exceptional status of the mining
industry vis-a-vis other employers. All employers should be subject to the same
regulations, without exception or exemption.
Since the mines also have training programmes for South Africans it appears that they
will also be exempted from paying a proportion of their foreign employees’ salaries into
a national training fund (section 12(4) and 16(5)). In other words, the Bill carries no
incentives whatsoever for the employment of South African over foreign workers on the
mines.
4.3

The White Paper specifically recommends that, in the interests of South Africans,
“negotiation among social partners could provide for quotas of workers who could be
sponsored by employers who are responsible for them and under specific programmes in
respect of which general conditions of employment do not apply and are regulated by
special conditions agreed upon by the social partners in Nedlac.
The Bill makes no reference to the White Paper’s recommendations for quotas. Nor does
it mention Nedlac or the provision to by-pass its basic policy position that no foreign
national should be employed in conditions worse than those of a local.

4.4

The White Paper recognized the need for informal traders from neighbouring states to
trade legally in South Africa. The White Paper rejected the idea of trader’s permits in
favour of subsuming traders under the general permit of entry (Section 4.1.1). This is
carried through in the Bill where there is no specific mention of traders at all. This is
unfortunate. If the intention of the legislation is to create an enabling environment for
traders, then the legislation should spell out that the General Entry permit also applies to
traders. The White paper noted that traders not in possession of documents could be
issued with a South African travel document. This suggestion has been dropped in the
legislation. In the absence of a traders permit, there is also the question of whether, by
definition, traders will be violating the conditions of the general entry permit. Is not
trading a form of work?

4.5

The White Paper proposed that all entrants to South Africa should pay a deposit through
a credit card which was refundable on exit. This was a pointless exercise and its absence
from the Bill is welcome.

4.6

The issue of same sex relationships is explicitly identified in Section 14.2 of the White
Paper as requiring legislation that is consistent with the constitution. This issue is not
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dealt with in the Bill. This is unfortunate given the Department’s legal stance on same
sex relationships in recent court cases.
4.7

In the Bill, the Immigration Service is established as a separate legal entity from the
Department of Home Affairs (section 27(1)). The Bill is clearer than the White Paper
was that the separation of the Immigration Service from the Department of Home Affairs
is to be complete. Indeed, in the Bill, the Department of Home Affairs and its DirectorGeneral only figure in the transitional sections (section 54-61).

4.8

The White Paper proposed the establishment of an Immigration Review Board. As
implemented in the Bill, this sixteen-member Board (now called simply the Immigration
Board) would be appointed and chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs (section 28(1)).
The portfolio committee would have a recommending power with respect to nine of these
appointments (section 28(1)(f) and (g)). There is no specific seat for a representative of
the national association of local government or any of the three components of Nedlac.

4.9

The Bill gives the Board rule-making, policy formulation, monitoring, and review
functions, without making any distinction in subject matter (section 32). The role of the
Board seems to have changed from the conception in the White Paper. There, while the
role was essentially unclear, the impression was that the Board would be an institution
that would not so much make or approve rules but rather that it will approve ISmotivated exceptions to existing rules or legislation.
Along with increased administrative autonomy for the Immigration Service comes
increased legislative power. This power comes at the expense of the Minister and
through the vehicle of the Board. In the Bill, the Board has the power to adopt
regulations (section 32(1)(a)). The procedures for such rule-making are given in draft
Bill section 33. A form of notice and comment rule-making is mandated (section 33(1)
and (2)).

4.10

The Bill’s proposed procedure differs from that proposed in the White Paper in form. In
the White Paper, the Immigration Service was to adopt regulations that would need
approval by the newly created Immigration Review Board. However, this change is
perhaps not so great at the level of substance. Although the Board may operate through
committees (e.g. draft Bill section 28(2)(d), section 28(5)), the Service would provide the
administrative capacity for the Board (section 28(4)). This administrative capacity would
likely include the drafting of regulations.
The draft Bill gives the Board a review function with respect to decisions of the Service
(section 32(1)(d) and section 34). The Board functions effectively as the final internal
appeals tribunal after the Managing Director functions as the first-line appellate body
(section 34(2)(a) and (b)). However, there is no specific structure on the Board designed
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to perform this function. It seems unlikely that review of individual decisions of the
Service will be considered by the full 14-member Board. Presumably, then, it will fall to
a committee of the 14 members to exercise the review function. Even then, without
administrative capacity, the review function would be a difficult one to exercise. And it
is an unlikely function to excite the interest of member of the Board. It thus seems likely
that the review function will be perfunctorily performed at the level of the Managing
Director and the Board.
5.0

Comments on Sections of the Bill

Section 3: Temporary Residence Permits. Common throughout the provisions describing the
various permits is the ability to attach reasonable terms and conditions onto the permit. This
seems logical and is done elsewhere, such as in Canada. However, the cost of monitoring that
the terms and conditions are being kept is prohibitive and just is not done. This has meant for
example, that entrepreneurs, whose conditions were to invest in a certain business within two
years of arrival, did not. The message here is that either one puts the resources into monitoring
the terms or conditions or one puts the onus on the permit-holder to report periodically that terms
and conditions are being met. Neither appears in this bill.
Section 4: General Entry Permit. It would appear unduly restrictive to limit the life of this
permit to three months. What is the reasoning here? Why not 4, 5 or 6 months?
Sections 5 to 17: The Description of Permits. The bill defines every possible kind of temporary
permit. This will prove to be very onerous to manage and monitor. In several cases (for
hospitals, teaching institutions, other government organs), the issuance of the permit has been
effectively delegated to a third party. This is a good idea, flexible and realistic, in that those
third parties know better than the Immigration Service who they want and who is bona fide and
who us not. Again, it is difficult to manage, to ensure that reporting from those delegates is
accurate and timely, so that truly, the immigration law does support market and cultural needs.
This has been done to name the parties who become liable under the Act for the presence in the
country of certain illegal reisdents.
Most permits require certifications from a Chartered Accountant to the effect that the prospective
permit holder is financially independent. Given that those Chartered Accountants would be
liable should their certification be incorrect, the profession could be reluctant to participate in the
way this bill would have them participate.
Section 8: The wording is very vague and it is unclear as to whether and how the investors and
self-employed become permanent. This kind of programme elsewhere has proven to be fraught
with fraud and malfeasance, requiring a lot of monitoring. Even then, there are studies that show
that little foreign capital is brought in in this manner.
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Section 12: Work Permits: This looks like a nice combination of employment motivated by
employers themselves and labour market prescription. But the demands on the employer seem
quite onerous. There is an equally onerous duty on the Service to follow up on these cases. In
Canada, in the high technology field, the Immigration Department developed a pilot project that
allowed the industry more flexibility, so that the Human Resources Department did not need to
be consulted in every case. Such flexibility is the tool of the future and these provisions in the
Bill are outdated, unless their true motive is really to dissuade employers from hiring foreigners.
Section 20(4): Permanent Residence: Again, the imposition of terms and conditions are
impossible to monitor. It becomes a game of “catch as catch can” and looks very arbitrary to the
person on the street.
Section 21: Of special concern here is the provision whereby a permanent residence permit is
cancelled where a marriage breaks up within 3 years from the date of issuance. This could be
particularly onerous on women. Elsewhere women have stayed (and suffered, and died) in
abusive marriages, because the husbands have threatened to report marriage breakdown to the
Immigration authorities. Policies are needed to provide compassionate treatment to these
spouses where there was abuse.
Section 21 (3): Why should a child have to confirm their permanent residence within 2 years of
having turned 21? This is onerous and inevitably will lead to those who don’t renew becoming
illegally inside South Africa. What social policy end is being served by creating more illegal
residents in this petty way?
Section 22: Ground for Residence: “good and sound character”: who defines this? Who decides
this?
Section 22 (1) – (3): It appears that certain jobs will bring with them permanent residence, while
others bring temporary residence, depending on the take of the Department of Trade and
Industry, year to year. Labour market analysts do not have the data to define the real market
needs within each sector on a yearly basis. This is cumbersome and will not support the need for
foreign labour.
Section 22: It is unclear when an investor will receive temporary or permanent residence, and
when a person with extraordinary skills and qualifications will receive temporary or permanent
residence. This is too vague to be fair.
Section 23: Prohibited Persons: This list would include only those who have been convicted of
an offence or at the least have been charged and a warrant has been issued. The field should be
widened since very few persons who have committed crimes against humanity or war crimes
will have charges laid and warrants issued. As well, this clause would not exclude those who
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have been charged by international courts of international crimes from becoming permanent
residents of South Africa.
Section 23 (c): Consistent with the extraordinary powers of discretion given to the Service, this
clause even gives it the power to declare citizens of whole countries to be prohibited persons.
Section 25 2(b): The Minister is given a wide discretion to waive regulations and grant
residence, but also a wide discretion to exclude persons and categories of persons “for good
cause”. This is exactly the kind of exemption (under Sections 28 and 41 of the Aliens Control
Act) that have lacked transparency and caused considerable difficulties for the public and the
Department itself. The accountability of the Minister is also minimal: reporting to the Board!
At the very least, the Minister could be required to report to Parliament on a yearly basis on who
exemptions were granted to and why. The Australian model could be used here.
Section 26: Withdrawal of permanent residence: These are all standard grounds. Absent is
fundamental misrepresentation on application for permanent residence, and suggest it be
included. As well, war criminal and criminals against humanity are not included and ought to be.
Recent internationally embarrassing incidents involving such persons – e.g. Haile Mengistu
and Foday Sankoh – could be avoided by this change. The more important issue here is the
process by which someone will be given notice of the withdrawal. Will this be in the
regulations?
Sections 27 and 28: The Immigration Board directs the Immigration Service, but the Minister
shall represent and be responsible for the Service before Cabinet and Parliament. The Service is
headed by a managing director who sits on the Board that is also chaired by the Minister. There
are several possible conflict situations in this arrangement. This is a scenario for many conflicts
of will and interest. It does not help the Service do its work, nor does it help provide a good
public face for this legislation.
Section 29: Objectives and functions of the Service: There are too many objectives, some of
them conflict and finally, there do not seem to be tools in the bill to allow the Service to fulfill
them. For example: 29(1)(b): “facilitate and simplify the issuance of permanent and temporary
residence permits to those who are entitled to them…” How can they do this with the heavy
demands of the bill regarding this very task? And how can the Service promote “ a climate
…which encourages illegal foreigners to depart voluntarily”, yet still be known for promoting a
human rights based culture and for preventing xenophobia in the Service? The very bureaucracy
that sets out to create conditions that illegal residents will find so intolerable that they will want
to leave, will also be the bureaucracy known for tolerance and understanding and appreciation of
what LEGAL immigrants bring to the country? The public does not distinguish well between
illegal and legal immigrants. If the service is tough on illegal residents, that is enough for the
xenophobes to feel encouraged.
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Section 30: Powers of the Service: The most worrisome clause is subsection (e) whereby an
officer can stop anyone, citizen or otherwise to prove their immigration status. This is a police
state power, last exercised in the former Soviet Union and in South Africa before 1986. It will
create an environment of fear and suspicion and is excessive.
Privacy and other constitutional rights are at risk under the proposed community enforcement
policy. For example, Section 30(f) empowers an officer to “organize and participate in
community fora or other community based organizations to involve the citizenry in the
application and implementation of this Act and to educate the citizenry in migration issues.”
This strategy focuses specifically on services to the population (Section 30(d)). Section 48
allows the IS by regulation to require persons to report to the Service “any illegal foreigner.”
Section 47 mandates that institutions shall endeavour to ascertain the status of the persons
interacted with and to report illegal residents or persons of uncertain status. This policy of
requiring verification of identity and nationality potentially violates the constitutional right to
privacy (especially Sections 14 and 32(1)(a) of the Bill of Rights).
Section 33: Rule-making: There should be something in the bill on yearly public consultations,
and public reporting on the administration of the Act. There is little accountability on the part of
the Service, the Board or the Minister.
Section 34: Adjudication and Review: in other jurisdictions, the person concerned has 30
(Thirty) days to respond to a contemplated decision. In this bill she gets ten! There is little
procedural fairness here. An “appeal” to the Managing Director and then to the Board seem
wasteful, since they cannot be seen as independent. Also, there is no procedure for petitioning
the Minister, who has a wide discretion under the bill.
Section 36: There are constitutional constraints on the establishment of security services
whether such a service is part and parcel of the Immigration Service or under its command.
Section 37: There is no in-depth discussion of the detention of foreign nationals. Most of the
provisions of this section duplicate the constitutional problems of the Aliens Control Act. The
Immigration Courts could also play a role in ensuring constitutional accountability via-a-vis
continued detention of persons detained under the authority of the Immigration Service. There
should be a monitoring system like a judicial inspectorate to ensure that abuses in privatized
detention facilities are avoided.
Sections 41 and 42: Burden is placed on employers and learning institutions to show due
diligence. This is another reason why these institutions will think twice before participating fully
in this Act.
Section 43: Hotels are given the responsibility of reporting illegal residents under their roof.
And the burden shifts to the hotelier to prove they were not being harboured. There is a
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presumption here (and in the case of educational institutions also) of reverse onus. This will also
have the unintended consequence of putting the tourist industry on guard and speaks against one
of the goals of the white paper: to foster tourism! It is also unlikely that this method will “net”
many illegal residents who do not generally have the wherewithall to stay in hotels. The effect
will simply be to annoy and inconvenience tourists, citizens and business men and women.
Section 44(1): The requirement that everyone identify themselves means, in practice, a
requirement to carry identification. Quite apart from the police state implications of such a
stipulation it infringes the Constitutional rights of South Africans.
Section 45: Aiding and abetting: This is the most disturbing provision of the Bill and is its
foundation. It turns every illegal resident into a legal leper. It tries to ensure that no person or
body corporate in the republic will lend any assistance whatsoever to an illegal resident whatever
their reason for being in the country (e.g. someone who has overstayed because of a medical
emergency). It outlaws those who would advocate on their behalf and helps promote
xenophobia, since, as pointed out earlier, the public rarely distinguishes between legal and illegal
immigrants.
Section 52: Offences. In Section 52(3), heavy penalties are prescribed for repeat deportees,
including imprisonment and fines of up to R30,000. While the intent may be to try and
discourage revolving door migration, it is highly unlikely to have this result. Instead, within a
month of passage of such a clause, South Africa’s court system will be overwhelmed by
Mozambicans and Zimbabweans charged with a “second offence.” A clearer strategy for
criminalizing undocumented migrants and sending them to prison is hard to conceive of. This
clause is unworkable and its removal is recommended.
Section 52(10): Imposes heavy penalties (including imprisonment and fines of up to R50,000)
for anyone who “through offers of financial or other considerations or threats compels or induces
an officer to contravene the Act.” This clause is clearly designed to try and deal with massive
corruption in the present system. However, the proposal that penalties be doubled if a South
African official actually colludes in the process is bizarre. Contrariwise, this clause only
addresses half the problem. No penalties are imposed on officials who contravene and subvert
the Act. We recommend that equally heavy penalties be prescribed in the Bill for any official
who through extortion, acceptance of bribes, or the issue of false documentation subverts the
effectiveness of the immigration legislation.
Section 52(11): Assets may be confiscated by the Courts to defray the costs of deportation. The
real problem, which this Bill does address, is the wrongful seizure of assets by citizens and
others. This is a criminal action and should be explicitly identified as such in this legislation.
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6.0

Conclusions

6.1

SAMP would finally wish to draw the attention of the Department to the question of the
cost implications of the proposed reforms. One of the criticisms levelled against the
Green paper was that it did no systematic cost-benefit analysis and that the proposed
reforms were too costly to implement. The same charge has been levelled against the
White paper. A serious and systematic investigation of the costs and cost savings (if any)
of the proposed new system is highly recommended before this far-reaching Bill
becomes law.

6.2

There are various obvious contradictions and inconsistencies between the White Paper
and the Bill. One or the other needs to be brought into line. The Bill contains sections
implementing policies that are not in the White Paper. Various policy provisions in the
White Paper are not embodied in the Bill. This raises the question of whether or not the
White Paper is government policy. If it is, all aspects should be in the legislation.

6.3

The Immigration Bill proposed far reaching institutional and policy restructuring.
Various aspects are a significant improvement over the Aliens Control Act (see 1.6).
Others are a retreat in terms of human rights and constitutional guarantees. The
enforcement aspects of this Bill are particularly draconian and will impact negatively on
the rights of South African as well as foreign nationals, legal and illegal.

6.4

The Bill is a useful starting point for legislative reform and the replacement of the
anachronistic Aliens Control Act. However, the problems with the Bill in its current
form will not be resolved by minor tinkering with the language.

Endnotes
1.

This input was coordinated by Jonathan Crush with assistance from Susan Davis,
Jonathan Klaaren and Vincent Williams.
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